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had verbally agreed to redeem the property. Since there was
nothing of record to show that the right of redemption had been
exercised, the protection of the third person was clearly consistent with the leading case of McDufflie v. Walker.5
A writ of review has been granted by the Supreme Court
in the case of Baton Rouge Wood Products, Inc. v. Ezell,6 which
involves the question of revival of a mortgage subsequent to the
payment of the secured indebtedness.
The case of Younger v. American Radiator & Standard San.
Corp.7 is being noted in this Review.
TORTS*
PRODUCTS LIABILITY

William E. Crawford*
Leah Guerry***
Four products liability cases decided by the appellate court
in this last term deserve mention.' The Deris case arose when
plaintiff chewed bits of glass in a banana split she was eating.
The court predictably applied the Louisiana rules of warranty
2
in holding the defendant liable.
The remaining three cases, Meche, Larance, and West, were
decided by the application of principles of tort law. Not one
of the three cases brought forth any soul-searching on the problem of whether products liability cases properly are founded in
tort or in warranty. It is not the purpose of this brief commentary to probe that problem to its depth, but rather here will
be noted the current treatment being accorded products liability
5. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910).
6. 194 So.2d 372 (1966).
7. 193 So.2d 798 (La. App. 3d Or. 1967), writ refused.
* The Products liability section of Torts was written by Dean Crawford. The sections on Sheriff's Liability for Negligent Acts of His Deputy,
Noncompensable Mental Pain and Anguish of Parents Resulting From
Injuries to Their Child, and Duty to Warn Social Guest were written by
Mrs. Guerry.
** Assistant Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
*** Research Assistant, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. Meche v. Farmers Drier & Storage Co., 193 So.2d 807 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1967); West v. Hydro-Test, Inc., 196 So.2d 598 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Deris
v. Finest Foods, Inc., 198 So.2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Larance v.
FMC Corporation, 192 So.2d 628 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
2. Comment, 22 LA. L. Rnv. 435 (1962).
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cases by the Louisiana courts. Treatment in some depth is
already at hand in several writings.3
In West, the defendant was both the manufacturer and the
seller of an oil well overshot device allegedly negligently designed and manufactured. While the judgment was in favor
of the defendant, it is noteworthy that the court made the following statement of its view as to a manufacturer's duty for
such devices:
".. . the manufacturer of a dangerous instrumentality is

obligated to warn foreseeable users of the limitations of a
product when use beyond its limitations may be fraught with
potential perils."'4
The Meche case was brought against the manufacturer of
an industrial elevator which had killed the decedent when a
stopping device failed to function. The plaintiff alleged that
the manufacturer was liable because the stopping device was
either faulty in design or the elevator itself was improperly
constructed. The court found that the parts were properly made
and that the malfunction was due to improper installation which
was not the manufacturer's concern, and therefore held in favor
of the defendant manufacturer. The court made the following
statement of its view of a manufacturer's liability:
"A manufacturer or seller of a product which involves
a risk of injury to the user is liable to any person, whether
the purchaser or a third person, who without fault on his
part, sustains an injury caused by a defect in the design or
manufacture of the article, if the injury might have been
reasonably anticipated. '5
The Larance case is more intriguing. A fertilizer was sold
to a peach grower who dusted his orchard with it full strength,
thinking it was a fungicide and unaware that the material was
damaging to the trees and fruit if used undiluted. Plaintiff sued
both the seller and the manufacturer, founding his case upon
the allegation that the fertilizer container was inadequately
labeled. The court cast both the seller and the manufacturer in
3. Percy, Products Liability-Tort or Contract,40 TUL.L. REV. 715 (1966);
Murray, Implied Warranty Against Latent Defects: A Historical Comparative Law Study, 21 LA. L. REv. 586 (1961); Notes, 26 TUL. L. REV. 447 (1966),
38 TUL. L. REv. 194 (1963).

4. West v. Hydro Test, Inc., 196 So.2d 598, 606 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
5. Meche v. Farmers Drier & Storage Co., 193 So.2d 807, 811 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967).
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judgment, observing that "the action was predicated on the
alleged tortious conduct of both the dealer and the manufacturer."
"....

we conclude that FMC Corporation and the Tennessee

Corporation were both derelict in their duty to sufficiently
print or disseminate instructions concerning the proper use
of NU-Z, which if applied full strength was calculated to
damage property, and are therefore liable with their insurers, in solido, to plaintiff."'
The interesting point of this case is that the seller was
cast in judgment in solido with the manufacturer. What is
the duty of the seller in the distribution of a product of this
sort? The opinion does not specify precisely the basis of the
seller's liability. The seller's conduct relied upon by the trial
judge in his written reasons for judgment are referred to by the
appellate court and are apparently the bases for the finding
against the seller, viz., its acts of ordering and placing the
substance in the warehouse, leading plaintiff to believe it was
customarily used as a fungicide, and failing to warn plaintiff
that the dust could not be used undiluted. It seems that the
conduct of the seller was closely akin to misrepresentation in
the eyes of the court.
The Louisiana appellate courts decided these four cases in
accordance with the main stream of products liability jurisprudence across the country. In the one food case, it applied warranty, as has been consistently the approach in cases arising
from the use of products sold for human consumption or intimate
bodily use. In the other three cases the statements of authority
follow closely the principles announced generally throughout
the country.7
SHERIFF'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT ACTS OF

His

DEPUTY

Sheriffs have historically received a certain protection due
to the treatment by our courts of the question of a sheriff's
liability for negligent acts of his deputies. The courts in most
jurisdictions of the United States have refused to assess liability
6. Larance v. FMC Corp., 192 So.2d 628, 630 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966). See
Note, 28 LA. L. REV. 270 (1968), dealing with a vendor's liability for defective
products.
7. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 648-88 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 388-402B (1965).
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against a sheriff (or his sureties), except when an on-duty deputy
wrongfully does an official act.1 The strict judicial interpretation
of this rule is demonstrated when a deputy driving an official
car to serve a citation negligently strikes a pedestrian, and his
act of driving is held to be an unofficial act.2 It is questionable
whether this viewpoint serves the needs of a modern society.
With liability insurance available for a sheriff and his deputies,
the public interest might be served better by a less strict interpretation of what is an official act of a deputy for which a
sheriff will be held liable.
This question was presented to the Louisiana courts this
term in an action for wrongful death arising out of a plane
crash.3 The pilot of the plane, which was owned by the sheriff's
department, was a special deputy sheriff. He was bonded and a
commanding officer of the volunteer group, Sheriff's Air Squadron, although he was never on the payroll of the sheriff's
department. The pilot was flying the Mayor of Baton Rouge and
an LSU Professor of Government to a municipal officer's meeting
in Lansing, Michigan, and the accident apparently resulted from
the pilot's negligence in operating the plane under instrument
conditions, when he was not trained for instrument flying. The
sheriff had consented to the flight, and in fact he had intended
to be a passenger himself until a sudden illness changed his
plans.
The appellate court, viewing the case within its historical
framework, held that the deputy was not on an official act at
the time of the accident. In reversing this decision, the Louisiana
Supreme Court took a commendable step forward for the jurisprudence of the state in holding "the aircraft was under the
absolute control of the pilot for the duration of the entire trip
as the agent of the Sheriff."'4 The Supreme Court decision was
primarily concerned with the application of the direct action
statute to the insurer of the plane, but the merit of the court's
position on the official action of the deputy should not be
overlooked. By noting the varying duties of the office of a
modern-day sheriff, including mutual cooperation and the neces1. Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1189 (1967).
2. McVea v. Day, 6 La. App. 382 (1st Cir. 1927).
3. Webb v. Zurich Ins. Co., 194 So.2d 436 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), cert.
granted, 250 La. 263, 195 So.2d 145 (1967).
4. Webb v. Zurich Ins. Co., 205 So.2d 398 (La. 1967).
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sity of creating good public relations between his office and city
and state departments, the court brought into focus the proper
understanding of a sheriff's duties today and then correctly
placed the responsibility for negligence in performing those
duties.
NONCOMPENSABLE

MENTAL PAIN AND ANGUISH OF PARENTS

RESULTING FROM INJURIES TO THEIR CHILD

In Voelker v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,' the parents of a small
boy who was severely bitten and chewed by a dog sought
damages for their mental anguish from viewing the child's
injuries, awaiting the results of an emergency operation to
repair his wounds, and learning the prognosis that their child
would require psychiatric treatment for two or three years.
The entire subject of recovery for emotional distress in Louisiana
has been discussed in an earlier law review note and need not
be further elaborated here. 2 The courts have, almost without
exception, denied recovery where one member of a family
suffers worry and concern due to the negligent injury to another family member.3 In so doing, the courts are not necessarily denying the physiological effects of fright and shock, but
are rather considering the plea for damages within the framework of whether the negligent defendant who was responsible
for the original injury must also answer for the second injury.
The Voelker case is factually similar to an earlier Louisiana case
which denied recovery to a father who suffered a disabling
heart attack upon learning that his child was killed through the
alleged negligent driving of the defendant. 4 Determinations of
liability in this area should be made after careful comparison
with the case, Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,5 wherein
a pest exterminator was held liable for worry caused the parents
who believed poison had been eaten by their child. The facts
of that case, however, allowed the court to base liability upon
the breach of a duty owed by the exterminator directly to the
parents, due to their contractual relationship.
1. 190 So.2d 136 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).

2. Note, 23 LA. L. REv. 473 (1963).
TORTS §§ 46, 312, 313 (1965).
4. LaPlace v. Minks, 174 So.2d 895 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
5. 135 So.2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).

3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
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TO WARN SOCIAL GUEST

One Christmas night a Mrs. Foggin and her daughter-in-law
were carrying Christmas wrappings and boxes from the latter's
house to a trash receptacle. The dark backyard through which
they walked was enclosed by a fence with a gate that opened
outward. The daughter-in-law held the gate open for Mrs. Foggin to precede her through it, at which point Mrs. Foggin tripped
over a plank which was painted a dark color and nailed across
the bottom of the gateway, extending six or eight inches above
the ground. The suit that arose from Mrs. Foggin's injuries due
to this fall' afforded the Louisiana Supreme Court an opportunity to affirm the rule established by the intermediate courts,
unique to Louisiana, that a social guest is considered an "invitee"
to whom the landowner owes the duty of exercising reasonable
care for his safety.2 The court defined this duty further as one
requiring the occupant to warn the guest of a hidden or concealed peril. The daughter-in-law's tacit invitation for the
plaintiff to pass through the gate meant that plaintiff could
reasonably assume that she could walk through safely, negating
any assumption of risk on her part.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
PLEDGE

The necessity of delivery as an essential requirement for a
valid pledge' has been the subject of discussion several times in
recent years. 2 Generally, the matter is considered as of the time
of the making of the purported pledge agreement. There is no
reason why the parties could not agree to a later delivery, in
which event the pledge is only perfected at the time of such
delivery. In Steadman v. Action Fin. Corp.,4 the parties signed
1. Foggin v. General Guaranty Ins. Co., 250 La. 347, 195 So.2d 636 (1967),
remanded for further proceedings on the issue of quantum.

2. In all other American jurisdictions, the social guest is held to be a
mere licensee, to whom a lesser standard of care is owed. See Annot., 25
A.L.R.2d 598 (1952); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 60, at 388 (3d ed. 1964).

* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3133, 3152 (1870).
2. 18 LA. L. REV. 50 (1957); 33 TuL. L. REV. 74 (1958); 26 LA. L. Rlv. 182

(1965).
3. Sambola v. Fandison, 178 So. 276 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938).
4. 197 So.2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967), writ refused, 199 So.2d 918 (La.
1967).

